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Abstract 
We examine wealth effects, for banks and insurers, of bank rights to sell and un-
derwrite annuities. The stock-price reactions to four court and regulatory decisions are 
consistent with expectations of bank gains at insurers’ expense. Cross-sectionally, smaller, 
riskier insurers with higher distribution costs and substantial annuity business sustain larger 
wealth losses. Larger, riskier bank holding companies with fee-based and consumer busi-
ness gain most, consistent with the extension of federal safety-net guarantees as a source of 
gains. Banking stock-price reactions to the Supreme Court’s decision are opposite other 
findings, possibly reflecting unfulfilled expectations of a broader mandate for expanded 
bank rights.  1 
Wealth Effects of Banks’ Rights to Market and Originate Annuities 
The United States, Congress, after lengthy and contentious debate, in 1999 
passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial modernization act, relaxing product-line 
restrictions imposed by the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts. A focal 
point of the debate was whether it was wise to permit the convergence of banking 
with other financial services, including securities activities and insurance products. 
How this convergence affects the stability of the financial system remains a significant 
public policy concern.
1 
This paper uses event-study methods to examine the impact of earlier more 
piecemeal convergence of financial services in which courts and regulators expanded 
bank rights to market and originate annuity products. The annuity market is of par-
ticular interest to banks due to revenue generating potential and cost-advantageous 
product fit. 
                                              
1 For example, see the Journal of Financial Services Research symposium issue 
(Furlong and Kwan, 1999).   2 
Other recent literature studies the effects of financial reform legislation, includ-
ing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Carow and Heron, 2001).
2 A challenge in 
conducting such a study is that information tends to evolve slowly and in public view, 
hampering the ability to clearly identify a date on which salient developments “sur-
prise” the financial markets (Binder, 1998; Cornett and Musumeci, 1999). Focusing 
on judicial and regulatory decisions reduces the dilution of an event’s impact associ-
ated with publicly observable review, revision and debate. 
The costs and benefits of legislative, regulatory, and judicial actions supporting 
financial convergence are assessed differently by members of different industry sub-
sectors
3. Bank executives tend to support such initiatives and foresee the potential to 
increase revenues and lower costs through direct sales of insurance products, through 
joint ventures with insurers, and ultimately, as “one-stop shop” financial conglomer-
ates. Insurers express concern that banks have a cost advantage in retail distribution 
that banks could cut insurers out of the picture if the banks originate, as well as mar-
ket, insurance products. Some insurance executives believe that their firms will 
                                              
2 Earlier examples of such research include analyses of the passage of the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (Sundaram, 
Rangan, and Davidson, 1992), the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (Chen, Cornett, 
Mazumdar, and Tehranian, 1999), and risk-based deposit insurance (see Cornett, 
Mehran, and Tehranian, 1998). 
3 For further discussion, see Williams et al. (1997) and Hughes (1997).   3 
benefit by having access to banks’ lower-cost distribution system and expanded cus-
tomer base, while others expect that insurers will become takeover targets for banks. 
A particular concern for bank and insurance regulators is that an expanded role of 
banks in insurance may be less than a zero-sum game and that modernization finan-
cially weakens, rather than strengthens, an affected industry. Another concern is that 
the expansion of the government bank safety net to insurance products will transfer 
wealth from taxpayers to financial institutions. 
We document that bank holding company (BHC) stocks sustain statistically 
significant, negative average stock-price reactions to decisions that restrict bank annu-
ity sales. Decisions that expand bank annuity rights evoke a positive stock-price 
reaction. Stocks of life-insurance holding companies (LIHC) show a statistically sig-
nificant positive average price reaction to an early decision that restricted bank 
annuity sales, but insignificant reactions to later bank annuity announcements. Across 
the series of events, results suggest that initially, investors believed that expanded 
bank-annuity activity would be financially beneficial to banks and detrimental to in-
surers, consistent with a hypothesis of profit redistribution. As more information 
became available, stock market participants apparently continued to expect banks to 
benefit from expanded annuity activities, but not at the expense of insurers. This pat-
tern is consistent with wealth creation from increased operational efficiency, 
expanded safety-net subsidies, or both. 
Cross-sectional analysis reinforces this conclusion. It shows an information-
driven shift from investor concern that banks would gain annuity market share at the   4 
expense of insurers to recognition of wealth-creating efficiencies beneficial to specific 
segments of both industries.
4 
1.  Background and hypotheses
5 
Tables 1 and 2 show the scope of the annuity market for insurers and banks, 
respectively. Individual annuities are an important source of revenue for both indus-
tries. Table 1 reports that in 1998, life insurers wrote $95 billion of individual 
annuities, or 21% of net premiums written. Table 2 reports that bank-generated indi-
vidual annuity premiums in the same year were $19.6 billion, making up 63% of all 
insurance premiums that banks received. 
Banks trace their desire to offer services traditionally available from insurance 
companies to external market pressure. (American Bankers Insurance Association, 
1998). Banks face competition from nonbanks and are broadening their product lines 
to generate fee income and fulfill customer desires. Bank interest in insurance reve-
nue grew as the inflationary pressures of the 1980s reduced interest margins and bank 
operating income. Of particular interest to banks was the opportunity to generate fee 
                                              
4 We also considered the hypothesis that investors believed that allowing 
banks to sell annuities would threaten their tax-deferred treatment of annuity income. 
We found no evidence of such an investor perception. 
5 For another overview of bank insurance and annuity activities, see Williams, 
Feldstein and McSweeney (1997).   5 
income from the sale of annuity products to their customers through platform sales, 
in which licensed bank employees sell insurance products directly to bank customers. 
In 1990, in response to a request from NationsBank, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (OCC) issued two interpretations of federal law that expanded 
opportunities for banks to sell annuities. The first interpretation was based on section 
92 of the National Bank Act (12 U.S.C. §92), which restricted national bank sales of 
insurance to “places” with populations of less than 5000. The OCC construed the 
statutory language to authorize banks to conduct insurance agency activities from a 
city or unincorporated, census-designated area of less than 5000 in population. Sec-
ond, another provision of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §24 Seventh (1988 ed. 
and Supp. V) authorized banks to exercise “all such incidental powers as shall be 
necessary to carry on the business of banking.” Relying on the incidental-powers 
clause, the OCC determined that annuities are not an insurance product, but an in-
vestment vehicle, the sale of which is incidental to the business of banking. This 
determination permitted national banks to sell annuities underwritten by insurers in 
any location, not just in small towns. Insurers challenged both interpretations in 
court. 
In this paper, we analyze the wealth effects for the banking and insurance in-
dustries of four decisions concerning bank-annuity rights. The decisions are a federal 
appeals court ruling striking down the OCC’s interpretations, a decision by the OCC 
further expanding bank annuity rights, a ruling by the state of New York’s highest 
court permitting bank annuity sales, and a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that reversed   6 
the federal appeals court.
 6 Drawing on prior research and industry views, we develop 
and test two hypotheses about the distribution of financial industry benefits of ad-
justments in industry barriers. We call the alternative hypotheses: the market-
disruption hypothesis and the market-synergy hypothesis. 
The market-disruption hypothesis contends that profits on insurance activities 
will merely be rerouted from insurers to banks. One possibility is that banks would 
take market share from insurers due to a lower marginal cost of selling annuities. An-
other possibility is that bank obligations might be viewed as less risky than insurance-
company obligations even though federal deposit insurance does not formally protect 
annuity investors. The market-disruption hypothesis predicts that the amount bank 
stockholders gain from opportunities to market and originate annuities is roughly 
equal to the amount that insurer stockholders lose. The converse predictions hold for 
decisions that decrease bank annuity rights. 
The market-synergy hypothesis underscores the possibility that both banks 
and insurers can benefit from bank sales of annuities. For example, banks and insur-
ers may gain through joint ventures that leverage banks’ lower cost structure and 
depositor relationships to increase aggregate annuity profits. Banks might be disin-
clined to underwrite the annuities they sell, because they lack expertise in 
underwriting and managing the risks to capital associated with underwriting annui-
                                              
6 A contemporaneous paper by Carow (2001) investigates some of the same 
events as this one.   7 
ties. Banks might rely principally on marketing agreements to sell insurer annuities to 
bank customers through platform sales by bank employees licensed for the purpose 
(Lonkevich, 1995). The market-synergy hypothesis predicts bank stockholder wealth 
to be positively affected, and insurer stockholder wealth not to be negatively affected, 
by decisions that increase bank annuity rights. 
It should be noted that neither hypothesis implies that households necessarily 
gain from bank annuity rights. They could gain or lose either as taxpayers, through 
the expansion of government deposit-insurance liabilities, or as customers, depending 
on whether the fusion of banking and insurance creates monopoly power. For further 
discussion, see Carow and Kane (2001) and references cited therein. 
The market-disruption and market-synergy hypotheses are not mutually ex-
clusive. Each event can generate both synergy and disruption effects, with only the 
net effect on value rendered observable by event-study methods. Thus, our conclu-
sions focus on whether one or the other effect proves dominant. 
2.  Events examined 
Table 3 lists the event dates. The dates are identified by searching for the key 
word “annuities” in the headline or lead paragraph of Wall Street Journal articles in 
1991-1995. Articles on four dates deal with new developments in the regulation of 
bank annuity sales.   8 
2.1.  Event one: Town-of-5000
7 
The first event that we examine is the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
that annuities are insurance products and subject to the town-of-5000 rule. The ruling 
curtailed the right of national banks to sell annuities nationally. The court ruled that 
annuities are insurance products; consequently, a national bank could sell annuities 
only in small towns. The decision quashed the efforts of NationsBank and others to 
offer annuities from branches in larger cities. The Wall Street Journal report of the de-
cision (Bacon, 1993) quoted a banking lawyer’s view that the decision would “greatly 
undermine the value of the banking franchise.” 
If market estimates of future bank cash flows were conditioned on the expecta-
tion that national banks would be allowed to sell annuities in cities larger than 5000 
population, we should see a negative stock-price reaction for the bank holding com-
pany sample. According to the market-disruption hypothesis, the announcement is 
good news for insurance companies; positive stock-price reactions thus are predicted 
for the insurance sample. In contrast, the market-synergy hypothesis predicts that the 
announcement is bad news for insurance companies and should be accompanied by 
a negative stock-price reaction for the insurance sample. 
                                              
7 Nationsbank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life-insurance Company 
(Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 998 F.2d 1295, 1993).   9 
2.2.  Event two: New York Court of Appeals
8 
In March 1994, New York’s highest state court rendered a 6-0 decision that 
overturned existing regulations and gave state-chartered banks the right to sell annu-
ity products directly to their customers, rather than through a third party. The 
decision was viewed as significant for New York’s banking industry and as having 
possible national ramifications. Bank regulation experts quoted by the Wall Street 
Journal predicted that, because of the importance of New York, the decision might 
influence other state and federal decisions (Knecht and Scism, 1994). The Journal also 
quoted the New York Bankers Association’s view that the ruling positively affected 
franchise value, because state banks would no longer have to share commission reve-
nues with insurance agents. 
The market-disruption hypothesis predicts a positive wealth effect for banks 
and a negative wealth effect for insurance companies. Under the market-synergy hy-
pothesis, bank and insurer revenues should increase as a result of cooperative efforts 
in the marketing of annuities. Thus, the market-synergy hypothesis predicts a positive 
stock-price reaction for both the bank and insurance samples. The New York Court 
of Appeals ruling was consistent with the federal OCC contention that annuities are 
an investment product, not a form of insurance. 
                                              
8 New York State Association of Life Underwriters v. New York State Banking 
Department (New York Court of Appeals, 1994).   10 
2.3.  Event three: Blackfeet National Bank
9 
On May 13, 1994, the Wall Street Journal reported that the OCC agreed to al-
low Blackfeet National Bank of Montana to originate and market a product that 
structured annuity-like payouts as deferred returns on a certificate of deposit. Upon 
opening such an account, the holder was to select a maturity date. At maturity, the 
holder had the option to withdraw up to two-thirds of the principal and accrued in-
terest. The remaining balance would then be converted to a fixed life annuity 
payment at market interest rates. According to legal opinions obtained by the prod-
uct’s designer, American Deposit Corporation, no taxes would be due on the accrued 
interest during the deferral period. (Rehm, 1994.) The bank bore the actuarial risk 
created by a lifetime payment obligation, which the OCC recommended be hedged. 
The OCC’s action went beyond the previous decision authorizing national 
banks to sell insurer-underwritten annuities, because Blackfeet’s product would be the 
bank’s own deposit liability and therefore eligible for federal deposit insurance. The 
Wall Street Journal quoted statements from insurance industry associations predicting 
a potentially large negative impact on insurance-company sales (Knecht, 1994).
10 
Clearly, the OCC’s decision is viewed as good news for banks and bad news 
for insurers under the market-disruption hypothesis. Thus, the hypothesis predicts a 
                                              
9OCC Interpretive Letter (May, 1994). 
10Although similar CDs were subsequently marketed by several banks, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11
th Circuit ruled in 1999 that the OCC acted improp-
erly in permitting Blackfeet to underwrite a fixed life annuity.   11 
positive stock-price reaction for the bank-holding company sample, but a negative 
reaction for insurers. The market-synergy hypothesis is not applicable to this deci-
sion. By effectively giving a bank the authority to originate federally insured 
annuities, the OCC left little room for synergy between banks and insurers. 
2.4.  Event four: Supreme Court VALIC ruling
11 
The culmination of the controversy over bank annuity sales occurred when 
the U. S. Supreme Court, in NationsBank vs. VALIC, reversed the Fifth Circuit, ruling 
that national banks may sell annuities. In the unanimous opinion written by Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the court deferred to the OCC’s expertise in determining that 
annuities should be classified as investments and that their sale is an activity inciden-
tal to the business of banking. The ruling provides legal certainty that national banks 
may directly market insurer-underwritten annuities in any location. 
The market-disruption hypothesis predicts a positive stock-price reaction for 
the bank-holding company sample and a negative reaction for insurers. The market-
synergy hypothesis predicts a positive stock-price reaction for both bank and insurer 
portfolios. 
                                              
11 Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A., et al. v. Variable Annuity Life-
insurance Company, et al., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).   12 
3.  Data, Cross-Sectional Predictions and Methods 
3.1.  Life-insurance data and cross-sectional predictions 
To construct the LIHC sample, we searched the Center for Research in Secu-
rity Prices (CRSP), Standard & Poor’s Compustat, and Compact D/SEC files for SIC 
codes identifying the life-insurance industry. We added insurers that the SIC code 
search did not reveal but that appear in life-insurance samples in published articles 
that use event-study methods. We checked Moody’s Bank and Finance Manual to verify 
that the stocks were those of life insurers, life-insurance holding companies or multi-
line holding companies in which life-insurance assets are approximately equal to or 
greater than property-liability and other assets. Only firms with at least 300 daily re-
turns (of 526 possible) on the CRSP files from January 4
th 1993 to end of January 1995 
enter the sample. The above criteria produce a sample of 59 life-insurance stocks. 
From Best’s Insurance Reports 1995, we collect yearend 1994 data on insurer 
characteristics that potentially affect the stock-price reaction for use in cross-sectional 
analysis. For holding companies with more than one life-insurance subsidiary 
(groups), we compute a weighted average of each characteristic. The weight for each 
subsidiary is its admitted assets as a fraction of the total admitted assets of all life sub-
sidiaries in the group. 
Under the market-disruption hypothesis, riskier insurers would be more 
threatened by competition from banks, especially if stock-market participants believe 
— or believe that consumers believe — that banks’ government deposit guarantees 
cover annuities. Therefore, the market reaction to rulings expanding banks’ annuity 
rights should be more positive for larger and financially stronger insurers. We meas-  13 
ure financial strength by surplus as a fraction of admitted assets and by a dummy 
variable indicating an A.M. Best rating of A or better. Under the market-synergy hy-
pothesis, riskier insurers would benefit more from cooperation with banks in the sale 
of annuities, implying less positive reactions for larger and stronger LIHCs. 
Under the market-disruption hypothesis, greater dependence on annuity busi-
ness and on expensive distribution methods implies greater vulnerability to bank 
competition. Therefore, these factors are predicted to be associated with a more nega-
tive market reaction to expanded bank-annuity rights. We measure dependence on 
annuities using annuity reserves as a fraction of admitted assets. Our proxy for high-
cost distribution is the use of independent agents as the primary sales channel.
12 
The market-synergy hypothesis makes opposite predictions. Market synergy 
should allow insurers that specialize in annuities and that rely on independent agents 
to gain from banks’ marketing of annuities. Cooperative efforts between insurers and 
banks have the potential to increase aggregate annuity sales and reduce insurer ex-
penses by using banks’ lower cost distribution systems. Consequently, under the 
market-synergy hypothesis, insurer stock price gains are expected to be an increasing 
function of annuity reserves and use of independent agents. 
                                              
12 Carow (2001) suggests that agent resistance to competition is a barrier to an 
insurance company distributing its annuities through banks.   14 
3.2.  Bank holding company data and cross-sectional predictions 
Searching the CRSP database for relevant SIC codes at the time of the bank-
annuity decisions establishes the initial sample of bank holding companies. It is likely 
that small BHCs would already be taking advantage of the town-of-5000 rule to sell 
annuity products. Also, the smallest BHCs are less likely to have an extensive office 
network with high revenue potential and low marginal costs of distribution. There-
fore, we restrict the sample to BHCs whose market capitalization exceeded $500 
million on December 31, 1994. Ninety bank holding companies meet the criterion. 
We collect yearend 1994 BHC characteristics that potentially relate to the 
stock-price reaction. Data on the geographic distribution and concentration of offices 
on June 30, 1994 come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) de-
posit branch office reports.
13 Financial statement information for December 31, 1993 
and December 31, 1994 is obtained from the Disclosure database. Consumer loans 
and total loans are collected from the FDIC call reports for the lead bank, defined as 
the largest bank in the holding company, as of December 31, 1994. Two BHCs leave 
the sample due to missing call reports, resulting in a final sample of 88 bank holding 
companies. 
We construct cross-sectional variables to measure banks’ potential distribution 
capacity and inclination to sell annuities. We posit that BHCs that are most restricted 
in their insurance activities have the most to gain from events that expand bank-
                                              
13 FDIC deposit information by branch is available once per year. June 30, 
1994 was chosen because it occurs within the period of the events analyzed.   15 
insurance activity. Consequently, we predict that larger BHCs and those with concen-
trated markets can generate more profits as a result of decisions that expand their 
rights to sell annuities. Thus, more positive market reactions should be associated 
with these characteristics under either the market-disruption hypothesis or the mar-
ket-synergy hypothesis. Size is measured as the log of total assets. The fraction of 
deposits in the state in which the BHC has its largest presence measures concentra-
tion in its primary market. 
We also conjecture that a BHC’s profit potential is related to its propensity to 
develop an annuity business. Two proxies for propensity are the BHC’s involvement 
in other businesses that generate noninterest income and the relative importance of 
current consumer-oriented business. The current importance of noninterest revenue 
streams is measured by total noninterest income relative to interest income. The ratio 
of consumer loans to total loans represents the relative importance of consumer busi-
ness to the company. We expect more positive market reactions to decisions that 
expand bank-annuity rights to be associated with these characteristics under either 
the market-disruption hypothesis or the market-synergy hypothesis. 
Previous research shows that weakly capitalized BHCs take increased risks 
due to the safety net created by deposit insurance. For stronger banks, the potential 
loss of charter value (value of net intangible assets) inhibits excessive risk-taking 
(Keeley, 1990, and John, John, and Senbet, 1991). Expanded bank annuity rights, if 
seen as an implicit or explicit extension of deposit-insurance guarantees to new lines   16 
of business, would create more value for riskier banks. We measure risk using the re-
sidual standard deviation of stock returns. 
3.3.  Methods 
We test the average stock-price reaction to each of the events using the multi-
variate regression model (MVRM) suggested by Schipper and Thompson (1983) and 
Binder (1985). The MVRM controls for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and contem-
poraneous cross-correlation of the residuals. The MVRM approach extends the usual 
market model to a conditional return-generating process by adding a dummy vari-
able corresponding to each event period. (See Karafiath, 1988 for a review of event 
study methods using dummy variable regression.) The event dates are identical for all 
the firms in this study, so we can estimate the MVRM by forming the stocks into a 
portfolio and estimating a single regression equation on the portfolio returns 
(Thompson, 1985). To increase the efficiency of the parameter estimates, we use port-
folio weights based on the estimated full covariance matrix of residuals, S. The 
residuals used to compute S come from first-pass OLS regressions for each stock. The 
vector of portfolio weights is P (1 S 1) S 1
1 1 1 = ¢
- - - . 
We estimate the following regression: 
pt p p mt pk
k
K
kt pt R R D = + + +
= ￿ a b g e
1
,  (1) 
where 
pt R =  return on portfolio p on day t; 
mt R =  return on the CRSP value-weighted NYSE-AMEX-Nasdaq index on day t; 
p a =  intercept coefficient for portfolio p;   17 
p b =  risk coefficient for portfolio p; 
pk g =  daily effect of event k on portfolio p, k=1,2,…,K; 
Dkt =  dummy variable, equal to 1 during event period k and 0 otherwise; 
pt e =  random disturbance which is assumed to be normal and independent of the 
return on the market and the event-period dummy variables. 
To test the effects of firm characteristics on the stock-price reaction to the 
events, we use an econometric method that controls for cross-correlations among 
firms’ stock returns and correlations between characteristics. It is important to control 
for such correlations in studies where all the firms have the same event dates and are 
in the same industry. The correlations are likely to be nontrivial, and tests derived 
under the assumption of zero correlation thus are more likely to be biased and ineffi-
cient than in a study where event dates are random across firms. The method is an 
extension of the approach pioneered by Sefcik and Thompson (1986), who use a dif-
ferent set of portfolio weights corresponding to each characteristic to re-estimate 
equation (1). The estimates of the 
pk g  then reflect the effect of the pth characteristic 
on the stock-price reaction to the kth event. 
However, unlike the MVRM method we use for the first set of regressions in 
the paper, the Sefcik-Thompson procedure does not account for cross-sectional het-
eroscedasticity and cross-correlation of the residuals. Therefore, we use an extension 
proposed by Chandra and Balachandran (1992). Chandra and Balachandran report 
that the extension, called the Portfolio Constant Correlation Model (PCCM) test, is 
well specified and more powerful than the Sefcik-Thompson test. The only previous   18 
application of the PCCM method in the finance literature of which we are aware is by 
Cowan and Power (2001). 
To calculate the weights for the PCCM tests of firm characteristics, let 
F X X 2 P = 1 L ,  (2) 
where  p X  is an N·1 vector of the pth firm characteristic (N is the number of stocks in 
the portfolio). The vector of portfolio weights corresponding to the pth characteristic 
is the pth row of the P·N matrix 
( ) ( ) ( ) W F C F F C = ¢ ¢
- - - 1 1 1 s s s s ,  (3) 
where s is a diagonal matrix, the nonzero elements of which are the residual stan-
dard deviations of the N stocks, and C is the constant correlation matrix of the raw 
returns of the stocks. (The diagonal elements of C are equal to 1 and the off-diagonal 
elements are all equal to the same estimated average pairwise correlation between 
any two of the N stocks.) We test the hypothesis that an event parameter 
pk g  is equal 
to zero using a t-statistic based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
(White, 1980). 
We check the sensitivity of our results to confounding events by examining 
the individual-firm Studentized event-parameter estimates from the first-pass OLS re-
gressions. For every firm with a Studentized parameter estimate greater than 2 in 
absolute value, we check the Wall Street Journal Index for potentially confounding 
news reports but find none.   19 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Stock-price reactions 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for the stock-price reactions of the insurer 
and bank-holding company samples, respectively, to the four events. In the insurance 
sample, for the Town-of-5000 event, in which the Fifth Circuit held that annuities are 
insurance, the event-coefficient estimate is a significantly positive 0.21%, representing 
a 0.63% cumulative average abnormal return for three-day event window. For the 
BHC sample, the coefficient estimate is –0.14% (–0.42% cumulative three-day ab-
normal return) and statistically significant. The results support the idea that in the 
absence of the Town-of-5000 decision, market participants expected fee-based reve-
nues and profits from bank-annuity sales to increase at the expense of the life-
insurance industry, consistent with the market-disruption hypothesis. 
The average stock-price reaction to the New York Court of Appeals event is in-
significant for both the bank and insurer portfolios. The state high court decision 
gave New York state-chartered banks the right to sell insurer-underwritten annuity 
products directly to their customers. A potential explanation for the lack of signifi-
cance is that the ruling immediately affected only banks chartered in one state, and 
lobbying resources would have to be expended to achieve the wider effect. The result 
suggests that the expected lobbying costs and benefits were roughly equal in magni-
tude. 
The third event analyzed is the OCC ruling that allowed Blackfeet National 
Bank of Montana to underwrite and market FDIC-insured annuity contracts. Industry 
observers opined that the ruling would be a greater threat to insurers than previous   20 
Comptroller rulings because national banks were in effect being allowed to under-
write annuity-type instruments for the first time. Tables 4 and 5 report an 
insignificant stock-price reaction for the insurer sample, but a significantly positive 
coefficient of 0.22% (0.66% cumulative average 3-day abnormal return) for the BHC 
sample. The result supports the market-synergy hypothesis: investors expected that 
expanded bank-insurance activities would be value adding to banks, but not detri-
mental to insurers. 
The last announcement is the Supreme Court decision in NationsBank vs. 
VALIC, reversing the Fifth Circuit. Tables 4 and 5 report no statistically significant 
wealth effect, though the coefficient estimate is negative for both insurers and banks. 
Comments in the financial and industry press around the decision often mention the 
hope that the court would use VALIC to provide comprehensive guidance concerning 
bank insurance activities under existing federal statutes. For example, an American 
Banker article argued that to sell annuities, banks at the time used “indirect, legally 
circuitous, and unnecessarily cumbersome distribution methods. Legal relief can now 
be hoped for from the Supreme Court. The court’s decision… could result in the 
simplified and more efficient delivery of investment products by and through banks.” 
(Roderer, 1994; emphasis added). Instead, the justices ruled narrowly on the OCC’s 
authority to permit bank marketing of insurer-underwritten annuities. By confirming 
that the OCC had the legal right and regulatory expertise to determine that annuities 
are not insurance, the court avoided the question of whether banks could sell insur-
ance except in small towns. Investors may also have expected that if the court   21 
accepted the argument that annuities are not insurance, it would follow that banks 
could underwrite their own annuities. However, by deferring to the OCC, the court 
avoided the question of underwriting. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion states that the issue 
at hand is whether banks may “serve as agents in the sale of annuities.” Arguably, the 
uncertainty that the court left about the questions of insurance sales and underwriting 
offset the benefits to banks and insurers of expanding the annuity market.
14 
4.2.  Cross-sectional analysis 
The cross-sectional tests of the effects of firm characteristics on stock-price re-
actions appear in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 reports that the stock prices of larger 
insurers decreased more, and those of insurers that market primarily through inde-
pendent agents decreased less, in response to the Town-of-5000 ruling. Larger 
insurers experienced larger stock-price gains in response to the New York Court of 
Appeals, Blackfeet and Supreme Court rulings, and those using independent agents 
experienced smaller gains. (However, the size coefficient is statistically insignificant 
for the Blackfeet ruling and the independent agent coefficient is insignificant for the 
Supreme Court decision.) The results conform to the market-disruption hypothesis, 
                                              
14 In 1999, in striking down the OCC approval of the Blackfeet National Bank 
product, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 11
th Circuit observed that the 1995 Su-
preme Court decision “focused on the ability of a national bank to broker annuities; 
our case turns on the ability of national banks to underwrite” fixed annuities. Black-
feet National Bank v. Nelson, 171 F.3d 1237 (1999).   22 
which predicts that smaller insurers and those with higher costs of distribution would 
be most affected. Also, consistent with market disruption and the potential expansion 
of the depository safety net, the stock prices of insurers with more annuity reserves 
and those with below-A ratings decrease more in response to the Blackfeet decision. 
The product for which Blackfeet National Bank received approval would expand the 
depository safety net to an annuity. Such a subsidy could undermine insurer-issued 
annuities that lack government backing. Given the risk differential between the new 
bank annuity and the insurance annuity, insurance companies with greater annuity 
exposure and lower ratings would be expected to lose the greatest market share. 
Table 7 reports cross-sectional tests of the effects of BHC characteristics on 
stock-price reactions. The table shows that the larger the total assets of the BHC, the 
larger the fraction of operating income from nonlending operations, and the larger 
the fraction of consumer business, the more negative the stock-price reaction to the 
Town-of-5000 decision. Larger BHCs were less likely to be able to sell annuities un-
der the Town-of-5000 rule, so it is not surprising that investors expected them to be 
hurt more by the decision. The negative coefficient on consumer business supports 
the conjecture that investors saw annuities as a consumer product for banks. 
Table 7 also reports that the reaction to the New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion is more positive for riskier banks and those chartered in New York. Investors 
apparently expected riskier banks to gain from perceived federal deposit insurance 
protection of annuity investors. The BHC stock-price reaction to the OCC’s Blackfeet 
ruling is more positive, the larger and riskier is the BHC and the greater its concen-  23 
tration of deposits in the largest office. Thus, investors expected large, financially 
weak, geographically concentrated BHCs to benefit most from the opportunity to in-
crease revenues through expanded opportunities to underwrite and sell annuities. 
The result for riskier BHCs is again consistent with the expansion of the safety net to 
annuities as a source of bank-industry value gains. 
Table 7 also reports that the market reaction to the Supreme Court Valic deci-
sion is more negative, the larger the BHC, the more concentrated its deposits, and 
the greater its fraction of consumer loans. The tenor of the BHC stock-price reactions 
to the Supreme Court decision is opposite to that of the Town-of-5000, New York 
and Blackfeet rulings: this time, investors marked down the stocks of BHCs more 
likely to profit from annuity rights. Again, investors may have been disappointed that 
the Supreme Court did not address the issue of bank underwriting of annuities. 
5.  Conclusion 
We investigate the wealth effects generated by expanding and contracting 
bank rights to market and originate annuities. In response to a federal appeals court 
ruling restricting bank annuity sales, life insurers experience positive stock-price reac-
tions and banking stocks experience negative reactions, on average. We also report a 
positive stock-price reaction, for banking stocks, to a decision by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency to allow Blackfeet National Bank to issue its own feder-
ally insured, annuity-like deposit instrument. Cross-sectional tests show that the stock 
prices of smaller, financial weaker insurers with greater proportions of annuity busi-
ness and those using independent agents are hurt more by the expansion of bank   24 
annuity rights. Until the Supreme Court decision in Valic, the stocks of larger, riskier 
bank-holding companies with geographically concentrated deposits and greater de-
pendence on non-lending activities or consumer business gained the most from the 
expansion of annuity rights. The results support the idea that the extension of the de-
posit-insurance safety net to annuities was a key source of the gains. 
The stock-price pattern is reversed in the response to the Valic decision. We 
speculate that the reversal may have been due to investor disappointment that the 
Supreme Court did not address bank sales of insurance or bank-originated annuities, 
as opposed to bank sales of insurer-underwritten annuities. With the exception of the 
cross-sectional analysis of bank stock-price reactions to the Supreme Court decision, 
the results are consistent with a market-disruption hypothesis. Investors appear to 
have believed that bank profits from annuity sales would come at the expense of in-
surer profits.   25 
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Table 1 
Source of Premiums 1998 Life-Health Insurance Industry (in $ Billions) 
Source: A.M. Best Co., Best’s Aggregates & Averages, Life-Health, 1999 Edition. 





Ordinary life (individual) 
Group life 
Individual accident & health 
















Total  453.5  100.00   28 
Table 2 
 





























Source: American Bankers Insurance Association, 1998 National Survey of Banks-in-
Insurance.   29 
Table 3 
Event Dates 
Variable Name  Dates  Description 
Town-of-5000  08/31/1993  United States Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rules that annuities are insurance 
products and subject to the “town-of-
5000” restriction. 
NY Court of Appeals  03/31/1994  Annuities are investments that state-
chartered banks in New York have the 
authority to sell. 
Blackfeet National Bank  05/13/1994  Blackfeet National Bank of Montana re-
ceives regulatory clearance to originate 
and sell annuity-like products without 
involving an insurance company. 
Supreme Court VALIC Ruling  01/19/1995  Comptroller acted properly in ruling 
that national banks may sell annuities. 
   30 
Table 4 
 
Event Study of 59 Life-insurance Stocks: MVRM Regression of Daily Return 
on CRSP Value-Weighted Market Index and Indicator Variables for Court 
and Regulatory Decisions Affecting Banks’ Right to Originate and Market 
Annuities in 1993–1995 
Coefficients of the Town-of-5000, NY Court of Appeals, Blackfeet National Bank, 
and Supreme Court VALIC Ruling event dummy variables measure the average daily 
stock-price reactions to those events in the respective three-day event windows. 
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent  t-statistics (White, 1980).  
 
The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance of two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
Variable  Coefficient 
Intercept  0.0003 
  (2.14**) 
   
CRSP VW Index  0.5828 
  (19.98***) 
   
Town-of-5000  0.0021 
  (2.24**) 
   
NY Court of Appeals  –0.0016 
  (–1.25) 
   
Blackfeet National Bank  0.0003 
  (0.49) 
   
Supreme Court VALIC Ruling  –0.0009 
  (–1.17) 
   
   
F  102.48*** 
Adjusted R²   49.2 %   31 
Table 5 
 
Event Study of 88 Bank Holding Company Stocks: MVRM Regression of 
Daily Return on CRSP Value-Weighted Market Index and Indicator Vari-
ables for Court and Regulatory Decisions Affecting Banks’ Right to Originate 
and Market Annuities in 1993–1995 
Coefficients of the Town-of-5000, NY Court of Appeals, Blackfeet National Bank, 
and Supreme Court VALIC Ruling event dummy variables measure the average daily 
stock-price reactions to those events in the respective three-day event windows. 
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent  t-statistics (White, 1980).  
 
The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance of two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
Variable  Coefficient 
Intercept  0.0001 
  (0.45) 
   
CRSP VW Index  0.6582 
  (21.53***) 
   
Town-of-5000  –0.0014 
  (–1.58*) 
   
NY Court of Appeals  –0.0001 
  (–0.10) 
   
Blackfeet National Bank  0.0022 
  (2.29**) 
   
Supreme Court VALIC Ruling  –0.0007 
  (–0.37) 
   
   
F  115.08*** 
Adjusted R²  52.1%   32 
Table 6 
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Stock-Price Reactions: Life-insurance Sample 
Coefficient estimates for 
pt p p mt pk
k
K
kt pt R R D = + + +
= ￿ a b g e
1
 run for each of K=5 
portfolios; 
pk g  measures the average daily effect of the p
th characteristic on the stock-
price reaction in the  k
th three-day event window. Numbers in parentheses are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent t statistics (White, 1980). The symbols *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance of two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  Firm Characteristic Portfolio 
Intercept, Market 
Index or Event 
Dummy Variable 





serves ‚ Assets 
(p=3) 
A.M. Best Rat-
ing below A 
(p=4) 
1 = Uses  
Independent 
Agents (p=5) 
Intercept   –0.0001  –0.0003  0.0009  0.0001  0.0011 
(aP)  (–1.92*)  (–0.72)  (1.77*)  (0.47)  (2.06**) 
           
CRSP VW   0.0745  –0.3634  0.3230  –0.0986  –0.1141 
Index (Rm)  (5.22***)  (–3.76***)  (3.59***)  (–1.55)  (–1.16) 
           
Town of  –0.0007  0.0021  0.0077  –0.0024  0.0078 
5000 (gP1)  (–1.85*)  (0.57)  (1.28)  (–0.55)  (2.51**) 
           
NY Court of  0.0012  0.0131  0.0041  0.0034  –0.0040 
Appeals  (gP2)  (1.82*)  (1.56)  (0.93)  (0.73)  (–1.78*) 
           
Blackfeet Na-  0.0009  –0.0024  –0.0143  0.0047  –0.0153 
tional Bk (gP3)  (1.09)  (–0.39)  (–1.80*)  (1.94*)  (–1.95*) 
           
Supreme Ct  0.0005  0.0018  0.0006  –0.0002  –0.0034 
VALIC  (gP4)  (4.53***)  (1.06)  (0.33)  (–0.09)  (–1.30) 
           
F  6.27***  5.19***  3.17***  1.12  1.69 
Adjusted R²  4.8%  3.8%  2.0%  0.0%  0.7%   33 
Table 7 
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Stock-Price Reactions: Bank Holding Company 
Sample 
Coefficient estimates for 
pt p p mt pk
k
K
kt pt R R D = + + +
= ￿ a b g e
1
 run for each of K=6 port-
folios; 
pk g  measures the average daily effect of the p
th characteristic on the stock-price 
reaction in the k
th three-day event window. Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedas-
ticity-consistent  t statistics (White, 1980). The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance of two-tailed tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
  Firm Characteristic Portfolio 
Intercept, Market 
Index or Event 
Dummy Variable 



















tion of Total 
Loans (p=6) 
Intercept   –0.0001  –0.0219  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.0006 
(aP)  (–0.71)  (–0.77)  (1.08)  (0.33)  (0.21)  (0.83) 
             
CRSP VW  0.3135  46.0741  –0.0457  0.0528  0.0514  0.2064 
Index (Rm)  (13.17***)  (7.84***)  (–1.43)  (0.70)  (0.61)  (1.52) 
             
Town of  –0.0010  0.1668  –0.0013  0.0016  –0.0042  –0.0063 
5000 (gP1)  (–2.25**)  (1.44)  (–1.53)  (0.62)  (–2.36**)  (–2.66***) 
             
NY Court of  0.0022  0.6052  0.0022  0.0001  0.0022  –0.0066 
Appeals (gP2)  (1.33)  (3.07***)  (3.60***)  (0.15)  (0.34)  (–0.60) 
             
Blackfeet Na-  0.0023  0.1529  –0.0004  0.0071  –0.0075  0.0057 
tional Bk (gP3)  (2.66***)  (2.26**)  (–0.64)  (3.62***)  (–0.54)  (1.05) 
             
Supreme Ct  –0.0024  –0.3487  –0.0006  –0.0050  –0.0032  –0.0164 
VALIC  (gP4)  (–2.37**)  (–1.17)  (–0.40)  (–2.64***)  (–0.63)  (–1.66*) 
             
F  34.89***  15.88***  0.69  0.96  0.47  1.59 
Adjusted R²  24.4%  12.4%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.1% 